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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jared Blake Frandsen appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress

evidence discovered as a result 0f a trafﬁc infraction stop.

Statement

Of The

The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

district court set forth the facts

0f this case as follows:

On January 2, 2017, [Sheriff’s Deputy] Bestor was driving 0n Main Street
Rexburg When he observed a vehicle that he believed belonged to Frandsen.
Bestor had previously received a tip that Frandsen was involved in selling drugs.
After Bestor turned around to try and locate the vehicle, he entered the parking lot
of a Quality Inn Where he observed the vehicle next t0 a Subaru. The Subaru
attempted t0 leave the parking lot and pulled onto the driveway leading to a
Maverik gas station and Main Street. The driveway does not lead anywhere else.
When Bestor observed that one 0f the Subaru’s headlights was out, he pulled the
vehicle over while it was still in the driveway. Bestor believed that the driveway
was a public road, but later conceded that the road was not publically maintained
and that he had been mistaken. Frandsen was seated in the back 0f the Subaru. As
Bestor asked for information from the driver and passengers, he stated that he
smelled the odor of marijuana and began questioning the occupants as to Whether
they possessed any marijuana. Frandsen was eventually discovered to have small
quantities 0f marijuana and assorted paraphernalia 0n his person and in the car.
in

(R.,

p.74 (explanation added).)

The

state

charged Frandsen with delivery of a controlled substance (marijuana) to a person

under the age 0f eighteen (Count

I),

Where children are present (Counts

two counts 0f delivery 0f a controlled substance (marijuana)
II

and

III),

and possession with

intent to deliver a controlled

substance (marijuana) (Count IV). (R., pp.55-57.) Based on the Fourth
States Constitution, Frandsen ﬁled a

resulting

motion

from the stop of the vehicle, arguing

Amendment 0f the United

t0 suppress all physical evidence

that because the

driven 0n private property with only one headlight, there

and statements

deputy observed the vehicle being

was no “reasonable,

articulable suspicion

0f criminal activity” t0 detain him, which violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment 0f the

United States Constitution.
T12), the district court

motion

(R., pp.41-44.) After a hearing

0n the motion

denied Frandsen’s suppression motion (R., pp.73-79).

to reconsider (R., pp.82-83),

Which the

district court

on Count
Count

I,

(R., p.94.)

The

three years with six

III, all

district court

appeal. (R., pp100-102.)

I,

II

and

III,

and Count IV

sentenced Frandsen t0 four years With one year ﬁxed

months ﬁxed on Count

Counts to run consecutive.

Frandsen ﬁled a

denied (R., pp.85-90). Pursuant to a

plea agreement, Frandsen entered conditional pleas 0f guilt to Counts

was dismissed.

(ﬂ generally 11/ 17/ 17

(R.,

II,

and three years With one year ﬁxed on

pp.104-107.)

Frandsen ﬁled a timely notice 0f

ISSUES
Frandsen
1.

Did

states the issues

0n appeal

the District Court err

as:

by denying Defendant’s Motion

concerning evidence seized during a trafﬁc stop

When

it

t0 Suppress
found the stop could

be based 0n a police ofﬁcer’s reasonable belief that a “future trafﬁc Violation”

was about
2.

Did

t0

be committed?

the District Court err

by denying Defendant’s Motion

to

Suppress

concerning evidence seized during a trafﬁc stop When it found the stop could
be based 0n a police ofﬁcer’s reasonable belief that a “past trafﬁc Violation”

had been committed, although unobserved, unreported and occurred

unknown time

at

an

if at all?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)

The

state rephrases the issuel as:

Did the

1

Because the

district court err in

denying Frandsen’s motion to suppress?

of Frandsen’s suppression motion was based 0n the “future
n0 need to respond t0 Frandsen’s second issue relative to a “past

district court denial

trafﬁc Violation” theory, there
trafﬁc Violation” theory.
the driver 0f the Subaru

is

(ﬂ R., p.78 (“Therefore, because Bestor had a reasonable belief that
was about

to

commit a

DENIED”),

p.89 (“However, the Court ﬁnds

was reasonable

t0 believe that a trafﬁc Violation

is

trafﬁc Violation, Defendant’s
it

was imminent”).
3

Motion

sufﬁcient that the facts 0f this case

to Suppress

show

that

it

ARGUMENT
The
A.

District Court

Did Not Err BV Denying Frandsen’s Motion To Suppress

Introduction

In

its

Decision and Order Re: Defendant’s Motion t0 Suppress, the

rejected the state’s “mistake of fact” and

district court ﬁrst

“community caretaking” arguments.

(R., pp.75-77.)

However, the court went on

t0

justify the stop 0f the vehicle

Frandsen rode in because the ofﬁcer reasonably believed

to enter a public

hold that Deputy Bestor had a reasonable, articulable suspicion t0

roadway without one of its headlights working.

(R., pp.77-78.) In his

reconsideration, Frandsen argued unsuccessfully that “a non-investigatory trafﬁc stop

based 0n the possibility that a trafﬁc Violation Will occur in the future”

by

the district court} “that there

is

motion for

may not be

(R., p.82), and, as

explained

a difference between a stop based 0n a perceived trafﬁc

Violation and a Terry investigative stop” (R., p.87).

fails.

was going

it

Frandsen’s argument, repeated 0n appeal,

Additionally, the district court’s denial ofFrandsen’s suppression motion should be

afﬁrmed

under the “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 0n a motion
to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

ﬁndings of fact that are

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 0f constitutional principles
t0 those facts.

State V. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,

2

456 (2004).

Although the district court’s case summary shows that Frandsen ﬁled a Memorandum of Law
0n the same day he ﬁled his motion for reconsideration, the Clerk’s Record does not include that
document.
R., p.10 (entry for 12/18/2017); p.82 (motion for reconsideration referencing
“Memorandum submitted in support of this Motion”).

(m

4

C.

Ruled That The Legality Of A Trafﬁc Stop For An Infraction
Is Determined BV The Same Standards Set Out In Terry v. Ohi03, Which Allows An
Investigative Detention When A Person Detained “Is, Has Been, 0r Is About” To Be
Engaged In Criminal Activity

The

District Court Correctly

For

its

response t0 Frandsen’s arguments, and except for the

district court’s analysis

conclusion regarding the state’s “community caretaking” argument, the state relies on the
court’s well-reasoned Decision

and Order Re: Defendant’s Motion t0 Suppress

Decision and Order Re: Defendant’s Motion t0 Reconsider

A and B

(respectively),

and incorporated

into this brief as if fully set forth herein.

the district court’s analyses and conclusions, the state

makes

and

Appendix

In addition to

the following arguments.

The Reasonable Suspicion Standard Of Terry Applies To Trafﬁc

1.

district

(R., pp.73-79),

(R., pp.85-90), attached as

and

Infraction Stops

On appeal, Frandsen contends that because Deputy Bestor “did not observe the Defendant’s
vehicle being driven contrary t0 trafﬁc laws, or that a trafﬁc Violation had, 0r

the stop

1,

was unreasonable pursuant t0

the Fourth

Amendment of the U.S.

was

occurring, then

Constitution and Article

Section 17, and the motion to suppress should have been granted.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.17.)

Although Frandsen
he preserved his

cites

both the federal and

state constitution issue

83); therefore, his

state constitutions

by presenting

it

0n appeal,

to the district court

it

does not appear that

m

(ﬂ R., pp.41-44, 82-

argument 0n appeal can only be based 0n the Fourth Amendment.

Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (holding “parties will be held to
the theory

upon Which the case was presented

to the

lower court”).

Frandsen contends that the “standards differ between observed trafﬁc Violations and
‘investigatory stops.”

stops differ

3

Terry

v.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.1 1-14.)

By

asserting that the standards for trafﬁc

from investigatory criminal detentions under Terry, Frandsen attempts

Ohio, 392 U.s.

1

(1968).

t0 limit the

of trafﬁc stops to infractions that have occurred, 0r are presently occurring, in an ofﬁcer’s

legality

observation, and not be subj ect t0 the “or

m

United States

by some

V.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 41

is

about to be” language applicable to Terry detentions.

1,

417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be justiﬁed

objective manifestation that the person stopped

activity”);

Berkemer

V.

is,

0r

is

about t0 be, engaged in criminal

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (same). Frandsen

is

incorrect.

Frandsen relies on an Ohio Court oprpeals’ decision, State V. Moeller, 2000

WL 1577287

*2 (Ohio App. 2000) (emphasis added), in which the court attempts to clear up the “apparent
conﬁJsion” over What constitutional standard applies t0 trafﬁc stops, stating:
First is the typical noninvestigatory trafﬁc stop,

wherein the police ofﬁcer Witnesses

a Violation of the trafﬁc code, such as crossing over the center line of a road, and

then stops the motorist for this trafﬁc Violation. Second is the investigative or
“Terry” stop, wherein the ofﬁcer does not necessarily witness a speciﬁc trafﬁc

have sufﬁcient reason t0 believe that a criminal act
occurring, and the ofﬁcer seeks t0 conﬁrm or refute this

Violation, but the ofﬁcer does

has taken place or

is

A
See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21
noninvestigatorjy traﬁic stop must be supported by probable cause, which arises
when the stopping oﬂicer witnesses the traﬁc violation. See Whren v. United States
suspicion 0f criminal activity.

(1996), 517 U.S. 806, 810

.

.

.

.

;Pennsylvania

v.

Mimms

.

.

.

(1977), 434 U.S. 106, 109

By contrast, an investigatory Terry stop is proper so long as the stopping
ofﬁcer has “reasonable articulable suspicion” 0f criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S.
.

at

.

21

.

.

.

.

In essence, Moeller states (incorrectly) that a non-investigatory trafﬁc stop

(1)

probable cause, and (2) an ofﬁcer’s observation of the trafﬁc infraction.

By

arguing that “non—investigatory trafﬁc stops” are only legal

in the past or present,

4

must be supported by

Frandsen

may also

When

they have occurred

be indirectly arguing4 that a routine trafﬁc stop must, as

Frandsen does not expressly agree with the “probable cause” aspect 0f Moeller’s statement, as

his Appellant’s Brief contains contrary statements that are clearly correct.

p.10 (“The legality 0f a trafﬁc stop
0hi0[.]”);

id.,

is

(“A trafﬁc Violation alone is sufﬁcient
States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)).)

Whren V. United

(E Appellant’s Brief,

analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry

v.

to establish reasonable suspicion.” (citing

Moeller

states,

be supported by probable cause, because an ofﬁcer

would invariably have probable cause
is

who

committed the

t0 believe the driver

infraction.

made

attempting t0 draw the same probable cause/reasonable suspicion distinction

his

argument

is

believe a criminal act

Although the

If Frandsen

in Moeller,

misplaced; a review of relevant law shows that the Terry standard applies fully t0

trafﬁc stops for infractions. Because Terry permits a detention if there

t0

witnesses an infraction

is

is

reasonable suspicion to

“about t0 be” committed, the same holds true as applied to trafﬁc stops.5

of this case are unique — reasonable suspicion that a trafﬁc infraction

facts

is

about

be committed — that dynamic does not require well-settled law t0 be changed 0r overlooked.
In State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho

Court of Appeals explained the adoption of the Terry reasonable suspicion standard, which also
applies t0 0f activity about t0 occur, as the standard applicable to trafﬁc stops:

A trafﬁc

stop

is

subject to the Fourth

Delaware

seizures.

trafﬁc stop

is

v.

Amendment

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653

restraint against

.

.

.

(1979).

normally limited in scope and 0f short duration,

unreasonable

Because a routine

it is

more analogous

an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is analyzed under
the principles setforth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at

to

653—54
Under Terry, an investigative detention is permissible if it is based
upon speciﬁc articulable facts Which justify suspicion that the detained person is,
has been, 0r is about t0 be engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 21
See also
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 1, 417
(1981); State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho
296, 302, 912 P.2d 664, 670 (Ct.App.1995).
.

.

.

.

.

.

Emphases added;

ﬂ

State V.

(emphasis added) (“[O]fﬁcers

upon reasonable suspicion

.

.

.

.

.

Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 349, 194 P.3d 550, 553

may conduct investigative

that

App. 2008)

detentions, including trafﬁc stops, based

an individual has been 0r

activity, including suspicion that a vehicle is

(Ct.

is

about

t0

be engaged

in criminal

being operated contrary to trafﬁc 1aws.”). Regardless

5

As the district court opined in regard t0 the cases cited by Frandsen below, the cases he cites 0n
appeal “all refer to an ofﬁcer’s ability t0 initiate a stop for Violating a trafﬁc law in the past 0r
present tense.” (R., p.87;

ﬂ

Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-14 (cases cited therein).)
7

0f what the law

is

stops, including

an ofﬁcer’s right t0 detain a person the ofﬁcer reasonably suspects

in Ohio, in Idaho, the reasonable suspicion standard

engaged in” a trafﬁc

of Terry applies to trafﬁc
“is

about t0 be

infraction.

In United States V. Choudhrv, 461 F.3d 1097, 1101-1 102 (9th Cir, 2006), the Ninth Circuit

considered, and rejected, an argument similar t0 the “two standards” argument presented

Frandsen, stating:
In

[Whren

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)], the Court held that

v.

When

police have probable cause t0 believe that a trafﬁc Violation has occurred, the

decision t0 stop an automobile
in

Whren argued

is

that, in the

reasonable. 5 17 U.S. at 810

.

.

.

.

The defendants

context of “civil trafﬁc regulations,” the Fourth

Amendment standard should be different-namely, that the standard should consider
Whether a reasonable ofﬁcer would have made a stop based 0n the particular
Violation, not
this

whether the ofﬁcer observed any Violation.

argument.

Instead,

at

811-12

at

.

.

.

id. at

818-19

.

.

.

(ii)

,

The Court

rejected

held that a trafﬁc Violation was sufﬁcient t0 justify an

it

investigatory stop, regardless 0f Whether

precinct,

Id.

(i)

the Violation

was merely pretextual,

id.

the stop departed from the regular practice 0f a particular

814-15

.

.

.

,

0r

(iii)

the Violation

was common and

insigniﬁcant,

id.

Thus, under Whren, so long as Ofﬁcers Silver and Chan had

.

reasonable suspicion to believe that Alvarado “violated the trafﬁc code,” the stop

was “reasonable under

the

discovered admissible.”

Id. at

Amendment

Fourth

819

.

.

.

[and]

the

evidence thereby

.

Choudhry seeks t0 distinguish Whren on two related grounds. First, he argues that
Whren does not apply because the reasonable suspicion inquiry centers 0n criminal
activity—that is, he asserts that Whren is limited to conduct for which the individual

may be

Second, he argues that in California, parking laws are distinct

arrested.

from other trafﬁc laws because of California’s separate civil-administrative scheme
for enforcing parking penalties. We ﬁnd neither argument persuasive.
1.

In separating civil parking Violations and criminal activity,

more narrowly than

Choudhry reads Whren

and our circuit law permit. Although the
reasonable suspicion inquiry does center 0n suspected criminal activity, Whren
carves out an exception in the context 0f trafﬁc stops, i.e., a stop is “reasonable”
where an ofﬁcer suspects an individual has committed a trafﬁc Violation. 5 17 U.S.
at 810
Whren is not limited t0 “criminal” trafﬁc code Violations. In fact, the
case speciﬁcally contemplated the opposite: at the outset of its opinion, the Court
noted that it was addressing the petitioners’ appeal in the scope of “civil trafﬁc
Violation[s].” Id. at 808
The Court explicitly declined to distinguish among
different types 0ftrafﬁc code Violations, be they standing or moving Violations. See
id. at 818-19
Indeed, we have interpreted Whren as applying generally t0
.

.

.

that decision

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

by

trafﬁc

See

code Violations.

sanctioning

all

stops

Willis,

431 F.3d

at

715 (describing Whren as

where the ofﬁcers have cause to “believe that the petitioner
cf. Miranda v. City ofCornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 &

violated the trafﬁc code”);

2005) (noting that although a “non-criminal” trafﬁc Violation did not
justify impoundment, it was “sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for police ofﬁcers t0 seize a
vehicle for a trafﬁc stop”). Thus, Whren does not distinguish between trafﬁc
n.

4

(9th Cir.

Violations enforced through a civil-administrative process and trafﬁc Violations
subj ect to criminal enforcement.

In United States V. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit

explained:

Prior t0 Whren,

it

was

settled

investigative trafﬁc stop.

.

.

law

that reasonable suspicion is

enough

t0 support

an

.

We d0 not believe that the Court in

Whren intended t0 change

passage 0n Which Lopez-Soto relies

tells

this settled rule.

us only that probable cause

is

The

sufﬁcient

Supreme Court announced
in Whren a new rule 0f law, as Lopez-Soto contends, we would expect it t0 have
acknowledged the change and explained its reasoning. Such an explanation is
notably absent from the Whren opinion.
to support a trafﬁc stop, not that

E

United States

V.

necessary. If the

Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2001) (“While either probable

cause 0r reasonable suspicion
reasonable suspicion

it is

is

is

sufﬁcient t0 justify a trafﬁc stop, only the lesser requirement of

necessary”). Based 0n the Ninth Circuit’s analyses

OfWhren in Choudhrv

and Lopez-Soto, as well as Idaho decisions such as Sheldon and Chapman, the standard for
conducting a trafﬁc infraction stop does not differ from the Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard

— which

6

includes conducting limited detentions for actions that are “about to occur.”6

In People V. Ellis, 14 Ca1.App.4th 1198, 1201-1202 (1993) (citation omitted), the defendant

driving 0n
“t0

private property at night with the vehicle’s headlights off, and an ofﬁcer stopped

remind him

t0 turn

0n

his headlamps, not to cite

him

for a trafﬁc Violation[;]” the court ruled:

Ofﬁcer Hart was not required

t0 wait until appellant actually drove

street t0 stop appellant.

Had

.

.

.

upon a public

Hart waited for appellant t0 drive 0n a public

and had a trafﬁc collision occurred, Hart would have been subject to
While Hart could not, perhaps, legally cite appellant in the
parking lot, appellant’s driving Without his headlamps 0n was activity “relating” t0
street,

justiﬁable criticism.

9

was
him

In determining that

Deputy Bestor was justiﬁed

in believing that the driver

of the vehicle

Frandsen rode in was about t0 commit a trafﬁc infraction by driving onto a public roadway (Main
Street)

with only one functioning headlight, the

district court explained:

When

looking at the totality 0f the circumstances, there are only two exits the
Subaru could have taken from the driveway: Main Street, or the entrance to
Maverik. It was entirely reasonable for Bestor to believe that the Subaru was going
to exit the parking lot of the Quality Inn by turning onto Main Street, where the
driver

would immediately be

in Violation

0f the

statute.

The Court holds

that

it

was

reasonable for Bestor to believe that the driver of the Subaru was about t0 commit
a trafﬁc Violation, and that enough reasonable suspicion existed t0 stop the vehicle.
(R., pp.77-78.) In its order

denying Frandsen’s motion t0 reconsider, the court further explained:

The Subaru was headed towards Main Street. As soon as it entered Main Street
from the driveway, a trafﬁc Violation would have occurred. The Subaru could have
entered the parking lot of the Maverik, but as the Court pointed out in
is mere
was about to

speculation.

decision, this

Violation

its

previous

was reasonable to believe that a trafﬁc
ﬁnds that it was not necessary, given
Bestor to wait until the Subaru entered Main
It

occur, and the Court

the circumstances 0f this case, for
Street t0 effectuate a stop.

(R., pp.88-89.)

The

district court’s rationale

makes

driving toward the exit of the private driveway and

it

would not have been reasonable

certainty that the vehicle

for

him

was not going

to wait

to the

sense.

Main

When Deputy Bestor saw the vehicle

Street With a nonfunctioning headlight,

simply because he

Maverik

may

not have

known With

store.

Although not discussed below, the relatively short distance between the hotel parking

Where the Subaru was

initially

parked, and the Maverik store, reasonably suggests the occupants

0f the vehicle would have walked t0 the store
10,

14;

11/17/17 T11, p.18, L.16

“determine

it

was 300

feet”

street.

—

if that

was where they were going.

(E

St.

Exhibits

p.19, L.5 (“app used for taking satellite photos” used t0

“between Main Street and the front of the Quality Inn parking

a Violation 0f Vehicle

lot

Code

section

24400 and

it

was “about

The suppression motion was properly denied.
10

to occur”

0n a public

lot”.)

Deputy Bestor could reasonably presume
hotel parking lot and onto

actually drove onto

Main

Based on the
court’s

t0

Main

Street.

that the vehicle

was heading out of the driveway

The deputy was not required

Street before stopping

district court’s orders,

it

to the

t0 wait until the vehicle

for a headlight Violation.

and the additional arguments presented above, the

ﬁnding that Deputy Bestor had reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was about

commit a

trafﬁc infraction

by driving onto Main

Street with a

broken headlight should be

afﬁrmed.

The Vehicle Stop For

2.

A

Broken Headlight

Was

Valid Under The Community

Caretaking Function

The community caretaking function involves

the duty of the police to help individuals that

ofﬁcers believe are in need of immediate assistance.

State V.

Wixom, 130 Idaho

752, 754, 947

P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citing In re Clay_ton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401 (1988)). “In analyzing

community caretaking function
test.” Li.

cases, Idaho courts

have adopted a

totality

of the circumstances

“The constitutional standard in community caretaking function cases is Whether intrusive

action of police

was reasonable

in

m,

View of all surrounding circumstances.”

754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State V. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 81

1,

130 Idaho

814

(Ct.

at

App.

1995)) (brackets omitted).

The

district court rej ected the state’s

the vehicle pursuant to the

it

community caretaking function in order to keep

only had one functioning headlight.

reaching

its

argument that Deputy Bestor was justiﬁed in stopping

decision, the court noted

(R.,

pp.76-77;

ﬂ

it

off the roadway when

11/17/17 Tr., p.51, L.3

Deputy Bestor’s testimony

“that he

was

—

p.53, L.6.) In

in the parking lot

because he believed that Frandsen was in the area and he had received information that Frandsen

was dealing drugs.”

(R., p.5;

see 11/17/17 Tr., p.77, L.6

11

—

p.78, L.6.)

With

that factual

background, the court focused on a statement from CadV
(1973),

Which

V.

Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441

reads:

Local police ofﬁcers, unlike federal ofﬁcers, frequently investigate vehicle
accidents in Which there

n0 claim of criminal liability and engage in What, for
term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally

want of a better
divorced from the

is

detection, investigation, 0r acquisition of evidence relating to the

Violation 0f a criminal statute.

Emphasis added. The court opined:
Bestor testiﬁed that he pulled the Subaru over because one of the headlights was
not working, and he believed that this
headlight use.

He

was a

also gave testimony that he

Violation of the statute governing

was

in the parking lot because

he

believed that Frandsen was in the area and he had received information that

Frandsen was dealing drugs. The State argues that Bestor acted out of concern for
the occupants and others

0n the road, but

this

argument

is

unconvincing.

Bestor

did not believe that the occupants of the Subaru needed police assistance, nor did

he “perceive a medical emergency 0r other exigency compelling [his] immediate
action.” [State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct. App. 2016)].
Instead, he pulled the Subaru over because he believed that a statute was being
violated and possibly because he

was already searching

cannot use “community caretakingfunctions
clearly

”

for Frandsen.

t0 justlﬁ/ the stop

The State

when Bestor was

engaged in “the

t0 the violation

ofa

detection, investigation, 0r acquisition ofevidence relating
”
criminal statute, as community caretaking duties are “totally

divorced ”from an oﬁcer ’s duties related t0 gathering evidence regarding criminal
activity. Id.

The

district court incorrectly rej ected the state’s

First,

when asked

at the

community caretaking argument

suppression hearing, “Does

it

in

two

respects.

create a hazard t0 the public t0

operate a vehicle 0n a public roadway without a headlight?” Deputy Bestor answered, “It does.”
(1 1/ 17/ 1

7 Tr., p.52, L.24

— p.53,

L.2.) Therefore, as

he was Viewing the hazard created by a vehicle

being driven with a broken headlight, the deputy was concerned that there was an “exigency

compelling
2016).

[his]

immediate action.” State V. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944

As noted

previously, in People V. Ellis, 14 Ca1.App.4th 1198 (1993)

California Court 0f Appeals

afﬁrmed the lower

12

(Ct.

App.

(ﬂ n.5, s_um), the

court’s denial 0f Ellis’s suppression motion,

holding that

it

was

t0” be committed.

legal for the ofﬁcer to stop Ellis for a no-headlight infraction that

The

Ellis court also relied

was “about

on the need to protect the safety 0fthe public,

stating:

Hart activated his overhead lights and stopped appellant to remind him to turn on

him

his headlamps, not to cite

most

effective

the street.

means

We

for a trafﬁc Violation.

to assure that

Stopping appellant was the

he would turn on his

agree With the prosecutor’s

common

lights before driving

sense argument

made

on

at the

suppression hearing. In view 0fthe potential harm t0 the public if appellant drove
street without headlamps on, Hart’s detention of appellant was

0n a public
reasonable.

Ellis,

Ct.

14 Ca1.App.4th at 1201-1202 (emphasis added);

App. 2010) (“[T]he

statute

ﬂ

Pruitt

V

934 N.E.2d 767, 770

State,

does not necessarily imply that a driver

is

allowed

at all

(Ind.

times and

circumstances t0 drive Without headlights on private property[,]” and “[s]uch a reading

under

all

0f the

statute

would run counter

“safety” factor applies here

—

to the policy

of facilitating safe automobile trafﬁc.”). The same

operating a vehicle at night With only one functioning headlight

creates an unreasonable risk 0f harm t0 other motorists

Second, the

district court

ruling, in effect, that the

and pedestrians.

took the “totally divorced” phrase from Cady out of context by

community caretaking justiﬁcation

because Deputy Bestor was

Although the court seems

also, at the time, investigating

t0 suggest that

for the trafﬁc stop

was not

available

Frandsen in regard to drug dealing.

Cady’s comment means a police ofﬁcer’s subjective

motives or expectations while engaged in a community caretaking function must be totally
divorced from any hope 0r expectation of detecting or investigating criminality,

community caretakingfunction
investigation or detection

— not an

the court’s ruling, an ofﬁcer

ofa crime.”

itselfthat

Cady alluded to

as being totally divorced

it

is

the

from a criminal

ofﬁcer’s subj ective motives or intent. Contrary t0 the tenor 0f

“may harbor

at least

an expectation of detecting or ﬁnding evidence

State V. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442, 445,

34 P.3d 1125, 1128

(Ct.

Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 304, 47 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002) (same).

13

App. 2001); State

V.

Based on the testimony of Deputy Bestor and the
function that

is

“totally divorced”

subj ective intent

must be

fact that

it is

the

community caretaking

from a criminal investigation under Cady — not

totally divorced

that

an ofﬁcer’s

from a criminal investigation — the denial of Frandsen’s

suppression should be afﬁrmed on this alternative ground.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

order denying

Frandsen’s suppression motion.

DATED this

13th day of November, 2019.

John C. McKinney

/s/

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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I
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copy of the BRIEF
and Serve:
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File
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I
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neal.law@att.net
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John C. McKinney
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Deputy Attorney General
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COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 0F THE
STATE 0F IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0F MADISON

IN THE DISTRICT

STATE 0F IDAHO,
Case No: CR-2017-1370
plaintiﬁ;

V.

DECISIONAND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT’S MOTION To

JARED BLAKE FRANDSEN,

SUPPRESS

Defendant.

This

is

a motion to suppress the inuoduction of evidence against the defendant, namely,

all

evidence obtained as a result of Defendant Jared Blake Frandsen’s (“Frandsen”) detention and

all

statements

police ofﬁcer

made

who

prior to his being advised of his

Miranda

rights.

Frandsen argues that the

stopped him, Deputy Braden Bestor (“Bestor”) could not have had reasonable

suspicion to do so because the vehicle Frandsen

even though one of the car’s headlights was

was

travelling in

out, the statute

was on private property and

mandating headlights only applies to

“highways,” which are publically maintained, and therefore the stop was

illegal.

The

State

contends that the ofﬁcer believed that the area where Frandsen was stopped was a “highway”

and encompassed by the meaning of the

statute.

The

State further states that the deputy

who

stopped Frandsen had reasonable suspicion that a traﬂic violation was being committed,
permitting the ofﬁcer to

make the

stop.

The

State also argues that the stop

of the vehicle was

permitted under Bestor’s “community caretaking duties”, since the broken headlight posed a

danger to the occupants of the vehicle and
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others.
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Aﬂer reviewing the motion and holding a hearing on the matter, the Court ﬁnds that
Besttorhad a reasonable belief that the driver ofthe vehicle was about to commit a trafﬁc
infraction. Therefore, Ehe

Coun DENIES

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The Court rules as

follows:

STANDARD 0F REVIEW

I.
‘

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.
of fact will be accepted

if they are

A district court’s findings

supported by substantial evidence, but the application of

constitutional principles to those facts is freely reviewed. State

v.

Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161

(2000).

BACKGROUND

II.

On January 2, 2017, Bestor was driving on Main Street in Rexburg when he observed a
vehicle that he believed belonged to Frandsen. Bcstor had previously received a tip that

Frandsen was involved in selling drugs. Aﬁer Bestor tumed around to try and locate the vehicle,

he entered the parking

lot

of a Quality Inn where he observed the vehicle next to a Subaru. The

Subaru attempted to leave the parking
station

and Main

Street.

lot

and pulled onto the driveway leading to a Maverik gas

The driveway does not lead anywhere else. When Bestor observed that

one of the Subaru’s headlights was

out,

he pulled the vehicle over while

it

was

still

in the

driveway. Bestor believed that the driveway was a public road, but later conceded that the road

was not publically maintained and that he had been mistaken. Frandsen was seated in the back
of the Subaru. As Bcstor asked for information

ﬁom the driver and passengers, he stated that he

smelled the odor of marijuana and began questioning the occupants as to whether they possessed

any marijuana. Frandsen was eventually discovered to have small quantiﬁes of marijuana and
assorted paraphernalia

DECISION

on

his person

and in the

car.
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ANALYSIS

III.

A trafﬁc stop is subject to'Fourth Amendment protections, including protection against
unreasonable seizures. State

v.

v.

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003), see also Delaware

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Trafﬁc stops are analyzed under the jurisprudence ﬁrst laid

down in

Terry

pennissiblé

person

is,

v.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

if it is

1

(1968),

which provides that “an investigative detention

based upon speciﬁc articulable facts

has been, or

is

“'rhich justify suspicion that the

is

detained

about to be engaged in criminal activity.” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983.

If a defendant challenges the legality

of a search or seizure bas¢d on the lack of a warrant (and

provided that defendant has standing to do so), then the burden shiﬁs to the State to show that the
search “either

fell

within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or

otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.” State

Reasonable suspicion

is

v.

was

Neal, 159 Idaho 919 (2016).

evaluated under a totality of the cimumstances standard, and

is

lower than probable cause, but “more than mere speculation or instinct on the pan of the ofﬁcer.”
Id.

The reasonable suspicion standard

is

met if an omcer observes a vehicle and has “a

reasonable and articulable suSpicion that the vehicle
the standard is not

is

being driven contrary to trafﬁc laws,” but

met if “the conduct observed by the oﬁicer fell within the broad range of what

can be described as normal driving behavior.” State

v.

Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180 (Ct.App.2004).

Frandsen argues that Bestor’s mistake of fact regarding the road cannot give

n'se to

reasonable suspicion on either subjective or objective gounds. The Court agrees with Frandsen
that

no good-faith exception

to the warrant requirement exists in Idaho under State

v.

Guzman,

122 Idaho 981 (1992). Therefore, Bestor’s subjective belief is irrelevant as to whether the level

of reasonable suspicion necessary

was objectively

DECISION

to

make the

stop existed.

As for whether his mistake of fact

reasonable, Frandsen argues that the characteristics ofthe driveway (for
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example,

its

lack of curbs, markings, or signs)

State argues that the driveway does have

believe that

lines

it

is

make Bestor’s mistake of fact unreasonable. The

some

characteristics that

publically maintained, such as

would lead an observer to

manhole covers denoting the presence of sewer

and the placement of the mailboxes. However, the Court agrees with Frandsen that this

mistake of fact was not obj actively reasonable.

As noted above and by both parties

in their

brieﬁng, the driveway leads to only two private businesses, Maverik and the Quality Inn.

driveway possesses no characteristics

common to

other publically maintained roads such as those

which abut shopping centers and other private businesses

in other areas, such as markings,

sidewalks, and lighting. Therefore, Bestor’s mistake of fact

The Court

is

not objectively reasonable.

also agrees with Frandsen that the stop cannot be justiﬁed

Bestor was fulﬁlling his community carctaking duties. In State
1991), the

The

v.

Conn of Appeals held that the oﬁicers involved were

by claiming that

Fry, 122 Idaho 100 (Ct. App.

not engaged in their

“community caretaking functions” when the oﬁicers detained the defendant in his truck aﬁer
deciding to investigate him. The Court of Appeals stated that “an ofﬁcer's community caretaking
functions are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence

relating t0 the violation

of a criminal

statute’”

and went on

to note that neither

of the ofﬁcers

involved in the defendant’s detention had approached him with “a belief that Fry needed police
assistance, nor did they perceive

a medical emergency or other exigency compelling their

immediate action.” Fry, 122 Idaho

at 102.,

see also

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)

(community caretaking functions “divorced” fromduties
v.

relating to violations

of statutes); State

McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007 (Ct.App.l989) (examples of community services, including

exigencies and medical emergencies).
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A similar situation is at play in this case.

Bestor testiﬁed that he pulled the Subaru over

becausé one of the headlights was not working, and he believed that this was a violation of the
statute governing headlight use.

he believed

Frandsen was in the area and he had received information that Frandsen was

that

dealing drugs.

He also gave testimony that he was in the parking lot because

The

State argues that Bestor acted out of concern for the occupants

and others on

the road, but this argument is unconvincing. Bestor did not believe that the occupants 0f the

Subaru needed police assistance, nor did he “perceive a medical emergency or other exigency
compelling

[his]

immediate action.” Fry, 122 Idaho

at 102. Instead,

he pulled the Subaru over

because he believed that a statute was being violated and possibly because he was already
searching for Frandsen. The State cannot use “community caretaking functions” to justify the
stop

when Bestor was

clearly

engaged in “the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence

relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” as

community caretaking duties are “totally

divorced” from an omcer’s duties related to gathering evidence regarding criminal activity.

Id.

However, the Court does agree with the State that reasonable suspicion existed, because
Bestor could have reasonably believed that the Subaru was about to dn've onto

where the driver would then be

in violation

of the

trafﬁc laws, but the Tenyjurisprudence in Idaho includes this statement

articulable facts

engaged

in criminal activity.” Sheldon, supra, emphasis added.

lot,

of the circumstances, there are only two

DECISION

a violation of the

ﬁ'om the Idaho Court of

permissible if it is based

which justify suspicion that the detained person

could have been going to the Maverik parking
totality

is

but this

exits the

Street,

Frandsen claims that no authority

statute.

exists to support the notion that the State could act preemptively to prevent

Appeals, cited above: “an investigative detention

Main

is,

upon speciﬁc

has been, or is about to be

Frandsen argues that the vehicle

is speculative.

When looking at the

Subaru could have taken ﬁ-om the

AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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Main

driveway:

‘

‘or

Street,

believe that‘the Subaru

Street,

the entrance to Maverik.

was going to

was entirely reasonable for Bcstor to

egit the parking lot

where the driver would immediawa be

was reasonable

It

of the Quality Inn by turning onto Main

in violation

of the

for Bestor to be'lieve that the driver of the Subaru

statute.

was about to commit a traﬁc

and that enough reasonable suspicion existed to stop the

violation,

does not contend that any of Bestor’s conduct
rights, the

The Court holds that it

vghicle.

after the stop violated his

Because Frandsen

Fourth

Amendment

Court will not evaluate any of Bestor’s conduct other than whether he possessed
I

reasonable suspicion to

make the

stop.

Therefore, because Bestor had a reasonable belief that the driver of the Subaru
to

was about

commit a trafﬁc violation, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS

Dated

this

SO ORDERED.

ﬂay

of December, 2017.

gﬂé‘m
Alan c. StephenEDismct
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

deay

of December, 2017, I did send a true and correct
I hereby certify that on this
copy of the forgoing document upon the parties listed below my mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by fax; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be delivered.
Sid D.

Brown

Rob H. Wood
159 E. Main Street
P.O. Box 350
Rexburg, ID 83440
Telephone: 208-356-7768

Madison County Prosecutor
Randolph B. Neal
482 Constitution Way, Suite 222
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: 208-980-6072
Facsimile: 208-419-3474

Attorneyfor Defendant

Clerk of the District Court

Madison County
IgahS/Lj

/

/
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APPENDIX B

IN THE DISTRICT

COURT 0F THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0F MADISON

STATE 0F IDAHO,
Case No: CR~201 7-1370

plaintiﬁ;

v'

J ARE

DECISIONAND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION To
RECONSIDER

D BL AKE FR 4NDSEN’
Defendant.

This

is

a motion to reconsider this Court’s denial of Defendant Jared Blake Frandsen’s

(“Frandsen”) motion to suppress evidence gathered ﬁ'om a traﬁic stop in the parking lot of a
Quality Inn. The Court held that the stop could not have been justiﬁed by Deputy Braden
Bestor’s (“Bestor”) belief that the driveway where he stopped the vehicle Frandsen

in

was a publically-maintained road,

unreasonable.

since the characteristics of the driveway

was traveling

made such a belief

The Court also held that the stop could not be justiﬁed by invoking “community

caretaking functions.” However, the Court held that because Bestor could have reasonably

believed that a trafﬁc vioiation was about to occur, reasonable suspicion existed and the stop was
justiﬁed. Frandsen asks the Court to reconsider this holding.

Aﬁer reviewing Frandsen’s Motion to Reconsider, the Court ﬁnds that the
speciﬁc situation justiﬁed a reasonable belief that a

Mo

violation

facts

of this

was about to be committed

and also justiﬁed a beliefthat a traﬁ‘ic violation had already been committed. The Court ﬁnds
that either

DENIES

of these reasonable beliefs was suﬁicient to justify the

stop. Therefofe, the

Court

Frandsen’s Motion to Raconsider. The Court rules as follows:
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

I.

The Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure have no

explicit rule permitting

a district court to

hear a motion for reconsideration on an order in a criminal case analogous to Rule

1

l.2(b)(l)

of

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has previously stated
that “a 1Iial court is

ﬂee to

entertain such

a motion when made.” State

v.

Montague, 114 Idaho

3 1 9, 320 (Ct.App.1988)(following the federal approach). However, “whether a district court can
entertain such a

motion to reconsider in the criminal context is dependent on the rule under

which the preceding motion (and subsequent decision by the
also State

v.

district court)

was made.”

1d. ,

see

Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 73 1—32 (Ct.App.2002) (motions to reconsider not permitted

for decisions

on motions ﬁled under ICR 35). Where there

to suppress akin to the requirement in

ICR 35

that

is

no requirement governing motions

mandates that only one motion can be ﬁled,

the Court can hear this motion.

When the court hears a motion for reconsideration,

it

must consider any new admissible

evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. Fragnella

v.

Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012). 'Ihe couxt must apply the same standard ofreview that
the court applied

“when deciding the

original order that is being reconsidered.” Id.

BACKGROUND

II.

0n January 2, 201 7, Bestor was driving on Main Street in Réxburg when he observed a
vehicle that he believed belonged to Frandsen. Bestor had previously received a tip that

Frandsen was involved in selling drugs. Aﬁer Bestor tumed around to try and locate the vehicle,
he entered the parking lot of a Quality Inn where he observed the vehicle next to a Subaru: The

Subaru attempted to leave the parking
station

and Main

Street.

lot

and pulled onto the driveway leading to a Maveu’k gas

The driveway does not lead anywhere

else.
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one of the Subaru’s headlights was

out,

he pulled the vehicle over while

driveway. Bestor teﬁtiﬁed that he believed at the time that the driveway
later

it

was

still

in the

was a public

road, but

conceded that the road was not publically maintained and that he had been mistaken.

Frandsen was seated in the back of the Subaru.

and passengers, he

As Bestor asked

stated that he smelled the odor of marijuana

for information

ﬁom the driver

and began questioning the

occupants as to whether they possessed any marijuana. Frandsen was eventually discovered to

have small quantities of marijuana and assorted paraphernalia on his person and in the

ANALYSIS

III.

In

its

decision

on the motion to

car.

suppress, the Court relied

on the language of State

v.

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003), in which the Court of Appeals stated that “an
investigative detention is permissible if it is based

justify suspicion that the detained person

has been, or

is

Supreme Court held that police

officers

articulable facts

which

,

about to be engaged in criminal

This Statement derives ﬁom Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

activity.”

States

is,

upon speciﬁc

1 (1 968),

in

which the United

may initiate investigative stops based on

reasonable suspicion. Frandsen contends that there

is

a difference between a stop based on a

perceived traffic violation and a Terry investigative stop. Frandsen bases this diﬁ'erence on the
phrasing found in the cases which deal with trafﬁc stops which were initiated for a violation of
trafﬁc laws, instead

refer to

an oﬂicer’s

See State

v.

of for other

investigative reasons.

ability to initiate

The Idaho cases which Frandsen

a stop for violating a trafﬁc law in the past or present tense.

Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10 (Ct. App. l994)(driver was continuously weaving under

direct observation

by ofﬁcer); State

v.

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930 (1992)(defendant observed

walking away ﬁ-om scene of burglary); State

v.

Flowers, 131 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 1998)(stop

must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle
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contrary to trafﬁc laws or that either the vehicle or the occupant

connection with a violation of other laws). Frandsen implies

is

subject to detention in

ﬁom the phrasing found in these

cases that no ability to initiate a stop for future violations exists, meaning that since the occupant

of the Subaru was on private property and not on a highway as deﬁned in the Idaho Code

at the

time of the stop, that the stop was invalid because no violation ofthe trafﬁc laws was occurring.

However, the
App. 2008), which

State points to language

states:

“oﬁicers

may

ﬁom State v.

Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 349

(Ct.

conduct investigative detentions, including traﬁic stops,

based upon reasonable suspicion that an individual has been or
activity, including suspicion that a vehicle is

is

about to be engaged in criminal

being operated contrary to

traﬁ'lc

language indicates that under Idaho law, police officers have the ability to

laws.” This

initiate

a stop if an

individual is about to be engaged in criminal activity, and that this ability extends to uaﬂic
violations. Therefore,

and a Terry stop

under Idaho law, no difference between a stop based on a trafﬁc violation

exists;

both are analyzed under the reasonable suspicion standard. Because

Chapman included traffic violations in its analysis of the reasonable
permits an ofﬁcer to stop an individual

suspicion standard, which

when the oﬁicer has reasonable

suspicion that the

individual is about to engage in criminal activity, the Court must give eﬁ‘ect to Idaho precedent

and disregard Frandsen’s

citations to other jurisdictions,

which are only persuasive

Frandsen does not address the circumstances of the
Court’s earlier decision.

stop,

The Subaru was headed towards Main

Main Street from the driveway, a trafﬁc

violation

which played a large role
Street.

mere

speculation.

It

was reasonable

in the

As soon as it entered

would have occurred. The Subaru could have

entered the parking lot of the Maverik, but as the Court pointed out in

is

authority.

to believe that

its

previous decision, this

a u‘aﬁc violation was about to occur, and

DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION T0 RECONsmER

4

Page 88

the Court

until the

ﬁnds that

it

was not necessary, given the circumstances of this

Subaru entered Main Street to effectuate a

The Court

is

aware

that the ability to stop

was

facts ofthis case lead the

lawful. Additionally, the Court notes that Bestor could

belief that a trafﬁc

home

stop.

a vehicle for a future trafﬁc violation will not

be applicable in many other cases, but the speciﬁc
the stop

law had been violated. Because the property

or other private property of the driver of the Subaru,

that the driver

it

Court to hold that

have possessed a reasonable

at issue

was a hotel and not the

was reasonable

for Bestor to believe

of the Subaru had previously committed a traﬁic infraction by driving to the hotel

parking lot in the ﬁrst place.
to function

case, for Bestor to wait

was when the

It is

not likely that the ﬁrst time the headlight on the Subaru failed

car attempted to leave the parking

sufﬁcient that the facts of this case

show that

it

lot.

was reasonable

However, the Court ﬁnds

to believe that

it

a traffic violation

was imminent.
Therefore, bccause Bestor had a reasonable belief that the driver of the

to

commit a traﬁc
IT IS

Dated this

violation, Defendant’s

Subam was about

Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

[ﬁh/day of January, 2018.

J/Qf’:
Alan c. Stepheﬂs, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
hereby certify that on

this
day of January, 2018, I did send a true and correct
copy of the forgoing document upon the parties listed below my mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by fax; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be delivered.
I

Sid D. Brown
Rob H. Wood
159 E. Main Street
P.O. Box 350

Rexburg, ID 83440
Telephone: 208-356-7768

Madison County Prosecutor
Randolph B. Neal
482 Constitution Way, Suite 222
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: 208-980-6072
Facsimile: 208-419-3474
Attorneyfor Defendant

Clerk of the Distict Court

Madison County Idaho
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